Reflections
html | pdf

Africa Policy Home Page | Roundtable Home Page | Roundtable Archive

Economy and Development

The first session of the Electronic Roundtable, covering economy and development, opened with panel presentations (January 11- 16, 2000) and continued with discussion by panelists and participants from January 17 through February 9. This chapter juxtaposes the views of panelists and participants, in their own words, on the critical economic issues confronting Africa.

The full archive, including e-mail contributions and English and French versions of all panel presentations, is available at www.africapolicy.org/rtable.

Panelists

Taoufik Ben Abdallah, Environmental Development Action in the Third World (ENDA), Dakar, Senegal
Paulina Makinwa-Adebusoye, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Yassine Fall, Association of African Women for Research and Development (AAWORD), Dakar, Senegal
Thandika Mkandawire, United Nations Research Institute on Social Development (UNRISD), Geneva, Switzerland
Dominique Njinkeu, African Economic Research Consortium (AERC), Nairobi, Kenya
Jacqueline Nkoyok, Confederation of Central African NGOs, Douala, Cameroon

Fall: Political economy issues are centrally important in development debates in Africa. Key to this global inquiry about Africa's evolution is the fundamental premise regarding the responsibility of the state for social and economic dynamics. Is the state responsible for allocating resources and determining which and whose wishes will be satisfied? Will African societies be better off if the mobilization and allocation of resources is left to foreign private firms primarily motivated by wealth accumulation? Is it better left to international financial and trade institutions or to bilateral development agencies? What is the potential of political intervention in promoting or impeding social welfare or striking a balance between public outcomes and foreign private interests?

Nkoyok: At first sight, our discussion theme reflects an indisputable paradox and it is therefore crucial for all of us to consider the dialectical relationship between the sovereignty of the State and the emergence of civil society. Is there need, for instance, for the sovereignty of State to give way to the emergence of civil society? In other words, could the civil society emerge if the State remains strong? One could even go beyond by posing the question of whether or not the ever-increasing role and space allocated to the civil society is tantamount to the suicide of the State and also contributes to its weakening? Or whether the current global environment condemns states to losing their sovereignty and condemns the population to silence?

Mkandawire: Perhaps the first important thing Africans can do is to reassume responsibility for plotting the paths of development in their respective countries. The tragedy of Africa's policy-making and policy implementation in the last several years is the complete surrender of national policies to the ever-changing ideas of international experts. Africans have lacked the confidence to consciously and vigorously craft and will a future for themselves.

The first attempts that Africans made at articulating a framework for their development were in the Lagos Plan of Action, the Final Act of Lagos, and UNECA's African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programs. Most African governments signed the documents, and, to date, none of these governments have publicly dissociated itself from the ideas espoused in them. But the World Bank virulently attacked those documents, and every African government that wished to have successful debt rescheduling or aid negotiations distanced itself from the principles in them. What is not often appreciated is that most of what appears today as new insights about the imperatives of poverty reduction, investment in infrastructure and education, the requirements of rapid industrialization, and the structural and institutional bottlenecks of Africa's underdevelopment are nothing but the rehearsal of old but disparaged ideas of African scholars and policymakers.

Njinkeu: If only Africans took themselves seriously and if only the international community listened, the long and costly learning curve could be minimized. The challenge is to blend macroeconomic stabilization cum adjustment under the SAPs with the detailed structural change and microeconomic and institutional transformations proposed by the Africans. The lessons from this costly experiment should provide the basis for future engagement.

Research in recent years, accompanied by the economic performances of countries with liberalized trade regimes, have definitely confirmed the benefits that can result from open trade regimes. The main policy prescription to African countries has therefore centered on openness in economic, social and political systems. Overall the policy regime of the typical African country, compared to the mid-1980s situation, can be characterized by improved market access to foreign markets for both goods and services, lowered barriers to entry into African markets, and competitive exchange rates with an overall shift from import substitution to policies encouraging exportoriented growth. It is also characterized by the adoption of market-oriented reforms in other areas, an increased role for decentralized administration, and of nongovernmental organizations and contested political systems.

Ben Abdallah: Although some view the forward march of liberalism as the solution to Africa's economic problems, the African economies are already the most open in the world. The ratio of external trade to gross domestic product is higher than that of many European and Asian countries. Openness by itself is a debatable remedy, because up to now it has not improved the position of Africa in global production and commerce.

Similarly, all-out budgetary austerity and privatization have not yet produced the anticipated results of growth and an improvement in the population's standard of living. Certainly, Africa as a whole has had positive per-capita growth over the last few years; but this growth, which has been accompanied by severe inequality in the distribution of wealth, fuels the frustrations of a population long marginalized. Nor has this growth resulted in an easing of the grinding poverty that afflicts the continent. Budgetary austerity imposed over many years has led to unmet social needs that the majority of African countries have great difficulty resolving.

Large-scale privatization of enterprises that were publicly controlled during the 1960s and 1970s has not yet led to the emergence of a private sector that can take the lead in terms of investments and the creation of employment and wealth. In many countries, privatization is accompanied- as in the Asian countries- by corruption. This has mainly enriched social groups close to those in power, and sometimes the powerful themselves.

The dismantling of customs barriers, together with the end of public subsidies to national enterprises, were supposed to foster competition between local products and imports, and lower the costs of production. But in the absence of a supply of highquality goods produced in sufficient quantity, this policy led to the closing of some local enterprises. Thousands of people were put out of work and massive amounts of cheap goods were imported from abroad.

Fall: The dominance of neo-liberal ideology set in motion adjustment policies. These policies sought to promote export-led growth so as to generate foreign exchange and sustain foreign debt service payment. The need for outside markets, cheap labor costs, and easy circulation of trade and investment across borders is responsible for intensified privatization measures. Indeed, both the World Trade Organization and the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, with formal rules and enforcement mechanisms, aggressively promote these policies to support the hegemony of transnational corporations.

Privatization essentially supports mergers and acquisitions. Privatization initiatives in Africa are mostly direct transfers from State monopoly back to the monopolies of former colonizers. In the process, corruption is boosted, usually through the enticement of government officials. For example, the privatization of utilities services like water, electricity, education, health or transport is a disaster. The rationale behind privatization includes promoting efficient management. In fact, African consumers experience a worsening of service delivery, more distortions, shortages and price increases. In addition, workers are unhappy because jobs and social security are shattered while expatriates are hired with huge salaries.

Njinkeu: At the global level, there has been substantial expansion in total trade in goods and services with trade volume growing by more than 3 percentage points above growth of real Gross Domestic Product. While these trends globally apply to developed and developing countries, it is important to note that African countries have been marginalized by these developments. Despite recent reforms in trade regimes, African countries have experienced a steady decline in their shares of world trade. At the international level, the share of export in total GDP increased from 17% to 21% between 1970 and 1990; while the share of African exports in world trade dropped from 0.8% to 0.3%.

This is due, among other reasons, to African concentration on a few primary agricultural and mineral products whose importance in international trade has been declining. It is also attributable to the low level of integration in dynamic production and distribution networks and weakeness in industrial and technological bases. At the global level, trade in services has grown slightly faster than trade in goods. Trade in manufactures has continued its long-term historical trend of growing faster than trade in agricultural and mining products, both in value and in volume terms. World prices of traded agricultural and mining products have lagged behind those of manufactures, leading to significant terms of trade losses.

As a result the benefits from globalization and liberalization of world trade have been unevenly distributed. An important policy challenge to African countries and the international community is the creation of a balanced and equitable multilateral trading system, which benefits the majority of the world population. African countries are likely to face increased protection in their export markets through "contingent" protection mechanisms such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to trade, anti-dumping and safeguard measures. These instruments are being used as substitutes for old-fashioned protection. The cost of abiding by the requirements of these measures is very high, as firms are expected to change their production and distribution infrastructure.

Mkandawire: We cannot overstress the role that international conjuncture can play in widening or further narrowing the road ahead. Africa must learn to compete in this global arena. Such a learning process will be facilitated not just by developing and participating in regional markets, but also by adopting an active strategy for increasing and diversifying Africa's exports. Africa's natural resources may facilitate this process. But, we should recognize that only a strategy that relies on our human capacities would create a development process that can respond flexibly to circumstances in a rapidly changing world.

Our natural-resource endowment will only contribute to development if we add intellectual value to it and if we use the revenue earned from it to transform and modernize agriculture. Doing so, we would strengthen the development of an industrial sector made competitive by a strategically orchestrated exposure to competitiveness in international markets. The current wave of simply opening up more mines according to something akin to the colonial "enclave" model does not augur well for the use of natural resources for development.

Africa should know that it cannot integrate itself fully into the global economy by permanently depending on aid and preferential treatment. Neither of these has served Africa well. Aid has produced a dependency syndrome that stifles both imagination and initiative, whereas preferential treatment (especially under the Lome Convention) has provided incentives to fossilize our production structures in primary commodities. What Africa needs as it approaches the 21st century is not increased aid but a leveling of the playing field.

An important element in this is an unconditional debt write-off for all the indebted SSA countries. Tying debt reduction to perceived compliance with certain performance standards may amount to circular reasoning. Poorly performing countries could blame their performance on the debt burden, whereas, the high flyers may owe their growth to debt relief, which currently comes by way of increased official aid.

Ben Abdallah: These new norms of global commerce are intruding into every domain of human activity. They are bringing about changes in systems of production and trade of goods and services, and increasingly, in world governance. The wealthy countries and transnational corporations profit most from these changes. The corporations, in their quest for immense size, mergers, and control of the planetary market, have deployed all their know-how to influence the multilateral negotiations in pursuit of their own interests: open markets, equal access for foreign investors, and privatization of life forms .

The new rules of global commerce, extended to investment, the environment, and different ways of life, impose adjustments on governments and economies. These rules require new investments in research, infrastructure, and training that only the industrial countries are in a position to undertake.

In light of this situation, what choices does Africa have other than to submit to the international institutions, on the one hand, or to pursue policies that in no way ensure integration into world trade, much less a sustained improvement in living conditions, on the other?

It is difficult to imagine Africa's integration into the world economy based on specialization in primary commodities, on scarcely diversified economies, and on devastated social sectors. Rather, the foundation must be massive investment in education and training and in economic and social infrastructure, together with the construction of stable and democratic institutions. Without these, no vision of sustainable development stands a chance.

Makinwa-Adebusoye: Recent decline in both fertility and mortality levels has shifted the demographic balance in favor of those in the 15-24 age group, which numbered 149 million in 1998, constituting about 20 per cent of total African population. Their sheer size and the rapid growth of this population sub-group, which is growing faster than total population, make them a group deserving special attention.

The decisions of this young population concerning when and how many children to have will determine the future size and the quality of life of Africa's population in the 21st century. But Africa stands to reap a demographic bonus, i. e., a wave of young people entering the work force without a wave of children following, when the present "bulge" of young people comes into the workforce. If adequately trained, and if jobs can be found for these prospective entrants into the labor force, the "workforce bulge" can be the basis for more investment, greater labor productivity and rapid economic development.

Nkoyok: By its very nature, the phenomenon of globalization opposes recognizing the specificities of the development process. On the contrary, the countries of the South could form regional groupings amongst themselves. They could set up markets of scale essential for any economic development and which are a stepping stone for competitivity. African countries, given the fact that they are languishing under the burden of external debt and rendered powerless by the distractive World Bank and IMF programs of debt alleviation, have no voices anymore. Only civil society organizations have their word to say. But how do they go about this, and through which mechanisms of dialogue? How are their voices taken into account and by which institutions?

How could African countries benefit from this popular movement in order to recover from their current situation and express their viewpoints calling for the democratization of international institutions? These constitute key questions for all of us. Why, one might ask, do States on the verge of collapse hide behind a conservatism which does not entertain popular expression?

What is most required in the current world context is setting up mechanisms for dialogue, policy conception, and the sharing of visions. Faith in the internal capacities of these States and the enhancement of these capacities is especially needed. Consequently, there is a need to create a strong and responsible civil society capable of molding deliberative forums with governments and institutions. There is also need to establish states where the rule of law prevails and which could play the role of regulator. States can be an important impetus and creator of an enabling environment for development. Is it possible to have one without the other, and contribute effectively to overcoming the major challenges of our times?

Fall: The ideological choices of the Bretton Woods institutions determine the political economy of adjustment policies. The body of knowledge, economic models and socio-economic paradigms created outside African empirical realities are unilaterally presented as ideal solutions or "best practices" for all countries. Neoclassical economic theory guides the underlying assumptions of African economic policy formulation and development programs. It suggests that market relations, operative through individual property rights and the pursuit of self-interest to maximize desires are the most important of all social relations. Therefore, human wisdom and effort must be concentrated in facilitating market transactions because unregulated markets bring prosperity while economic intervention brings chaos.

Mkandawire: African economies are market economies. This means that although the state may draw up overarching developmental plans, implementing such plans depends on the responses of households, private entrepreneurs, and institutions. There have been two important lessons to be drawn from Africa's development experience. First, the failure to mobilize the resource-allocative functions of the market can only contribute to the inflexibility of the economy. Second, the failure to recognize the weakness of market forces in a number of fundamental areas can lead to failed adjustment.

Development policies will therefore have to be keenly responsive to the capacities and weaknesses of both states and markets in Africa and seek to mobilize the former while correcting the latter. Dogmatic faith in either planning or markets will simply not do.

Njinkeu: The marginalisation of African countries in international trade is also due to the fact that most countries face considerable administrative, institutional and financial problems at several levels. First is the lack of ownership of the rules and provisions contained in the multilateral agreements governing trade. "Ownership" of the rules is an important element in the functioning of a rules based system such as the WTO. where the central organization has limited power to enforce them. Building a solid sense of ownership of such rules among members begins with participation in establishing them.

In the context of the WTO, many African countries feel no sense of "ownership", mainly because they did not effectively participate in establishing them. These countries lack the capacity to substantively engage the wide range of WTO issues. Weaknesses are primarily at the following levels:

a. The Geneva-based delegations of these countries are often small and lack persons with the technical backgrounds needed to participate effectively. Links between the WTO delegations and home governments are not well developed;

b. The involvement of stakeholders, such as the business community and civil society is minimal.

c. Because of the complexity of the entire system, African countries made commitments beyond their administrative and institutional capacities.

d. Conflicting policy recommendations arise from the WTO and other institutions involved in policy formulation and implementation, notably the Bretton Woods Institutions.

In summary, international trade accords must take into account the market disadvantage of developing countries. They must acknowledge the differences in circumstances between developed and developing countries, and the fact that developing countries often face greater volatility, Opening to trade in fact contributes to that volatility, especially since developing countries have weak or non-existent safety nets and high unemployment is a persistent problem. Furthermore, it should also be accepted that developed and developing countries play on a "playing field" that is not level.

Ben Abdallah: The recovery of macroeconomic equilibrium, the privatization of publicly controlled enterprises, particularly the banking system, and the reform of investment codes had, among other objectives, the goal of encouraging foreign direct investment. This investment sought to fill the gap left by the State's disengagement and the weakness of national savings and national private sectors. The record of actual investment is highly dubious.

Apart from certain countries which have succeeded in attracting investment in diverse sectors (especially South Africa, Tunisia, Mauritius, and to a lesser extent Cote D'Ivoire, Kenya, and Botswana). the countries attracting investment are those that have oil or mineral wealth. The majority of African countries remain on the margins of capital flows. A second finding is that there is a clear trend toward the sale of national enterprises previously considered part of strategic sectors. For example, electric power companies, drinking water suppliers, and telecommunications enterprises. Some observers wonder whether African countries may indeed have gone too far with privatization.

Overall, foreign direct investment remains weak. It is concentrated in a small number of sectors, is minimally diversified, and yields few transfers of technology. What is more, the effects on the physical and human environment have at times been disastrous. Examples include forest exploitation in Cameroon and oil exploitation in Nigeria. In the last few years, it has been possible to demonstrate links in several cases between certain foreign investments and the prolongation of armed conflict, such as that in Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Republic of Congo, as well as links with corruption.

Can foreign direct investment strengthen the economy if there A sufficiently dense network of enterprises doesn't exist at the local level with which this investment can connect? Can foreign direct investment establish itself firmly in a situation where purchasing power is weak and the market is small?

Njinkeu: Regional integration will assist this process, especially as it regards the exploitation of economies of scale and in overcoming the limitations of market size. Over the next three decades, African countries are committed to a gradual integration of the continent within the framework of the Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community. Commitments made by African countries in international trade negotiations will therefore need to demonstrate consistentency with the regional integration objectives. But, they will also need a great deal of support in doing so. It is therefore urgent to develop a legal framework for entering into arrangements that could facilitate the long-term objectives of coordinating African economic behavior and integrating economies into the world trading system.

Ben Abdallah: Subregional integration, currently stalled in several parts of Africa, appears to be an essential stage in the long-term response to the challenges facing the continent. It offers the possibility of complementarity in infrastructure and training, as well as larger markets. But for Africa to profit from subregional integration, steps must be taken to diversify production and, thus, substitute the present overreliance on imports. Only the creation of wealth on the continent will allow Africa to overcome underemployment and poverty.

Subregional integration, however, is still on the drawing board. In the Southern African region, South Africa has not yet managed to build stable relations with its neighbors in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). Many potential conflicts persist. These relate not only to immigration and to divergent positions on armed conflicts, but also to the role of South Africa as an economic power in the subregion. These tensions were illustrated by the protests of the SADC countries following South Africa's signing of a separate accord with the European Union.

Similarly in West Africa, uncertainties persist as to relations with the Economic Community West African States (ECOWAS) despite the fact that the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) is a zone of monetary and trade integration,. There is also tension over the role of Nigeria, especially its military and economic role. Recent decisions to create a unitary currency for West Africa pose problems not yet entirely clear. These problems may jeopardize the stated commitment to integration.

Fall: Can we entirely trust bilateral and multilateral channels as means to address the major economic challenges of our times? My answer to this question is no. Any power when left unchecked loses accountability. However, it is within the power of governments and NGOs to abide by clear and simple rules, equity and governance. Transparent negotiations and agreements may determine the content of such rules. We must understand the necessary and important contributions NGOs can make to keeping governments, development agencies and financial institutions under permanent check.

Despite their contradictions, NGOs have demonstrated their critical role in sustaining the growth of democratic values and shaping an alternative vision of a world different from what powerful market forces are trying to impose upon peoplei. e., a vision of economic, political and social rights. In recent times, they have become synonymous with altering the balance of powers both nationally and internationally in spheres as diverse as human rights, economic and international trade policies, environmental health, gender equality, peace and knowledge sharing. The concrete results of NGOs are illustrated through their organized determination and success in making the Seattle WTO Ministerial Conference a failure, the banning of landmines, and the freezing of the OECD's Multilateral Agreement on Investment aimed at empowering corporations to the detriment of developing countries and endogenous people.

Mkandawire: For more than a decade, most of Africa has spent time and resources "adjusting" non-existent or defective markets. It was hoped that getting the prices and the monetary or financial fundamentals right would be the one medicine needed to ensure the health of African economies: poverty reduction, equity, growth, industrialization, macros/ ability, and so forth. The plethora of micro and structural changes, the development of human capital and infrastructure, and the institution-building required for a modern capitalist economy were recognized only as important footnotes in the development model. Evidently, at least in most of SubSaharan Africa, the nostrums for all economic ills have been overwhelmed by the enormity of the ailment. The irony is that it has taken more than a decade for us to rediscover that, as the World Bank finally admitted in 1994, "adjustment alone is not adequate for long-term sustainable development."

Fall: Further, the centerpiece of Africa's struggle for equality, human development and peace lies in one of the most profound imbalances: the lack of equality between women and men. There is inequality in terms of the lack of recognition accorded to womens' contributions in building society's welfare, their participation in economic and political decision-making, their access to and control over wealth and the surplus asset generated. Economic policies from colonial times to the adjustment era have progressively developed mechanisms that aggravate gender inequality. Their impact is in many cases more alienating for women than the informal constraints of preexisting institutions. Gender equality is yet to move from backstage to center stage. The momentum successfully created in Beijing is very slow to take place.

What can make delinquent African governments change the way they do business with women? Are African governments and the world community serious about gender equality? Why is the application of formal rules for engendering resource allocations and power sharing mechanisms so slow in taking place? Some of the answers lie in the fact that African governments and international institutions are led by conservative men with ideologies of the past. They surely deserve a failing grade for the gender biased policies they have been carrying out all over Africa. Women need and deserve more than literature and rhetoric in this new century. They want to see concrete, systematic and measurable change to reverse their situation for the better. Now is the time for them to set an institutional agenda.

African people hear often that information technology will make the continent develop and catch up with other regions. Well, the reality is that Africa enters the 21st century having the least developed telecommunication services and infrastructure in the world, with 26% of the world population sharing 2% of world telephone lines, and no control whatsoever on the content or nature of information being sold to its people.

Makinwa-Adebusoye: Women in African societies have subordinate status to men despite advances by some women - particularly, those who are educated and who usually reside in urban centres. The primary roles of most African women are those of wife and mother. Childbearing is an important determinant of social status. In most countries, children are the main source of old-age security for parents who have large families in order to ensure that a few of their children survive to adulthood. Children contribute to household income. They serve as farm workers and hawkers of assorted wares in the informal sector. Children are also relied upon to perform vital household tasks such as cooking and cleaning, as well as fetching potable water and collecting "free" fuel wood from forests, often from long distances.

Rapid population growth contributes enormously to over-utilization of resources and environmental degradation. In time, consumption of nearby resources like fuel wood results in increases in the time costs of their use. A household would need more child-hours to collect the same quantity of, say, water and firewood. This creates private incentives to have more children. Indeed, it results in a vicious circle in which child labor and rapid population growth lead to environmental degradation, which in turn, generates more work and the need for more children and thus, rapid population growth. The vicious circle reflects a child-dependency syndrome arising from unequal distribution of, and failure to ensure women's equal access, to wealth-creating resources.

Fall: Can African countries compete against European and American corporations and pharmaceutical companies who have the knowledge and power to patent seeds or medical products and prevent others from using them for developmental objectives? For instance, it was recently reported that South Africa has plans to manufacture medicine for HIV/ AIDS patients in order to drastically reduce the costs for African AIDS patients. The pharmaceutical companies are using all kinds of intimidation against South Africa projects, including lobbying the US authorities to support them. This hurts every one in Africa. Particularly, it hurts women, who suffer most from AIDS. If the international community is serious about its concern for Africa's security, it would reconsider the heavy burden export led growth policies place at the expense of resources badly needed to care for women and children victims of the AIDS pandemic. Similarly, the industrialized countries deserve some ethics lessons. They silently watch, or actively support, their arms and mine industries fuel war to sustain their market in Africa.

Makinwa-Adebusoye: Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have been hardest hit by the HIV/ AIDS epidemic, and account for about 70 per cent of all HIV/ AIDS cases in the world. The disease usually strikes males and females between 15 and 49 years. These are adults in their reproductive years and who constitute the bulk of the economically active population. The dramatic increases in AIDS-induced deaths among the most active population groups who are also most likely to leave behind young children have created about 10 million orphans.

Its negative effects on macro-economic performance through the loss of large numbers of the economically active population, creation of unschooled children (as most AIDS orphans are likely to become) who will lack competitive skills in the job market, and the national costs of treating victims, make HIV/ AIDS Africa's number one development disaster.

In Africa, the number of the elderly population aged 65 years and over, though still relatively small, is increasing. Their number is expected to rise from 22 million in 1995 to 52 million in 2025.

Increases in the number of the elderly is occurring at a time when the traditional support system for the elderly, the extended family, is being eroded. The severe economic difficulties faced by many countries in the 1980s and the early 1990s have increased household poverty. Consequently, more women are working outside their homes to supplement family income, and are no longer available to care for aged parents. Moreover, massive rural-urban migrations and industrialization are reasons why working children are more likely, than ever before, to live away from older parents who are left behind in villages.

Yet, the elderly who are custodians of traditional values, and who, more than ever before, are being called upon (in some countries at least) to care for AIDS orphans, constitute a resource for development. Aging population can be expected to strain medical systems. Hence, there is need for planning to ensure a dignified and productive life for the elderly without jeopardizing the equally demanding needs of the young and adult population for education and health services, and employment.

Ben Abdallah: While governments concentrate on wooing foreign investors, little notice is taken that African economies depend fundamentally on informal activities, which involve a very large part of the population. Indeed, the informal sector is the principal source of jobs, allowing for a minimum creation of wealth and offering the main opportunities for a very young population to be economically active.

There is discrimination against those involved in the informal economy. This is reflected in terms of economic discourse. For example, the terms "investment" and "investors" generally apply only to the so-called modern economy, and of course to foreign investment. While many reforms are undertaken to attract foreign investment and create an economic, judicial, and institutional environment favorable to the private sector, the mass of small producers largely depend on programs to combat poverty.

The question, then, is how to strengthen enterprises within the informal economy so that they can increase their productivity, improve the lot of the population that depends on them, supply higher-quality products, and participate more fully in the overall economy. But can a strategy that implies favorable state action be implemented by governments that have lost their capacity to act in the context of an open economy?

Mkandawire: It has become commonplace to argue that measures adopted to deliberately accelerate development in other regions are inappropriate for Africa, not so much because things have changed but because of the alleged "peculiar" politics or culture of Africa. Our states are putatively more porous and vulnerable to capture than others. Our culture is not frugal enough or is downright antidevelopment. We invest too much in social relations to have any time for anything else. And on it goes. These views nourish the Afro-pessimistic stance that some have adopted. But they also nourish the arrogance of those who have chosen to assume the task of developing Africa without African involvement. As Ake has stressed, "the idea that a people or their culture and social institutions can be an obstacle to their development is one of the major confusions of current development thinking, and it is one of its most expensive errors."

However much we may loathe the attempts to locate Africa's poor performance on its supposedly immutable and peculiar characteristics, we must also recognize the need for fundamental changes in some of our attitudes, institutional arrangements, orientation to governance, and economic management. For example, the tensions and suspicion between the state and the capitalist class in many African countries that lead to massive capital outflows to safer havens are very unhealthy for the development of a capitalist economy. Furthermore, subordinating the national goals and development agenda to the narrow and often temporary interests of political survival or ethnic loyalty is hardly the best way to build a competitive and prosperous economy. In the end, there is no wishing away the sociopolitical issues that the transition to a market economy brings. Each country must, out of its own historical experiences, forge its own vision and design the requisite institutions to achieve development. Outsiders can assist, but this can never substitute for local initiative.

Njinkeu: Overall, the willingness of African countries to open their markets is real. The difficulties for doing so are mainly due to weak capacity (human, financial, institutional, etc). Accordingly, capacity building and technical assistance should be included in all international development initiatives. For example, this could take place through systematic inclusion of relevant special provisions in all agreements for developing and least developed countries. The special and differential treatment should be linked to the progressive elimination of supply and other constraints to competitiveness of African firms. International agreements shall be commensurate with African capacities and their efforts at economic and financial reforms as well as the diversification of their production and export bases. Likewise, these agreements should ensure that there is consistency and coherence with other policy commitments and that these do not conflict with the development goals of African countries. There is a need for African countries to build strategic partnerships and form coalitions among themselves, or with other developing countries. Fortunately conditions are better today and there are several reasons to be optimistic.

Fall: Local NGOs should not hesitate to challenge the World Bank's major policy choices and assumptions. They should work with independent African academics and researchers to revisit issues from a gender perspective and not be overly concerned with donor priorities. The exclusive reliance on foreign consulting firms and expertise is wrong. Such expertise should not be preferred over the invaluable contribution of homegrown ideas and solutions from local NGOs.

Development and human rights NGOs must not compete with each other but work together to bring meaningful contributions in policy design, moving from the periphery of domestic and world affairs to the mainstream of economic decision making mechanisms. Public accountability and transparency depends largely on the capacity of local NGOs to monitor the way budget items are ranked, ministerial disbursements made or priorities determined. States, as well as international institutions must be prepared to accommodate informed NGOs and more demanding constituencies. These constituencies include youth, women, peasants, educators, environmentalists, and students, who are willing, able and ready to play a role in the management of resources, services and opportunities.

Mkandawire: Moving African economies onto a development path will require robust state and societal institutions. These, in turn, will require creative mechanisms to produce a truly developmental state- society nexus able to synergistically mobilize human and physical resources and address the many contradictions inherent in our societies and in any processes of rapid change.

Economic development is quintessentially a political process involving the distribution of not only economic resources but also power. It is a process that heavily taxes the political system. It involves sacrifices and commitments that can only be sustained through a sense of shared vision and common purpose. It calls for the mobilization of national capacities. We have argued that such a process must be democratic. This is not only because of the inherent value of democracy but also because, given the nature of African societies, their social pluralism and the artificiality of national borders and the current political conjuncture, only a democratic developmental state can acquire the adhesion of a citizenry as diverse as one finds in African countries.

Participants

Atilla Alpman - Forging New Tomorrows International, Atlanta, USA
Djilali Benamrane - Economist, Niger
Patrick Otoo Bobbie - Florida A& M University, USA
Doug Brooks - Bradlow Fellow, South African Institute of International Affairs, South Africa
Olugbemiga Ekundayo - Morgan State University, USA Maxwell Gomera - Harare, Zimbabwe
Dr Ran Greenstein - Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE), South Africa
Ilan Hartuv - Truman Institute for Peace, Hebrew University, Israel
Dhimbil A. Hashi - York University, Canada
Opa Kapijimpanga - African Forum and Network on Debt and Development, Zimbabwe
Cecilia Kinuthia-Njenga - UNCHS (Habitat), Kenya
Karen Kwiatkowski- United States Air Force
David M. Leege - Phnom Penh, Cambodia
David MacDevette - Empowerment for African Sustainable Development, South Africa
Kathy McNeely - Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns, USA
Desta Mebratu - Research Fellow, UNECA, Ethiopia
Andrew A. Moemeka - Central Connecticut State University, USA
Chidi Odinkalu - InterRights, London, UK
Charles Okigbo - Department of Communication, North Dakota State University, USA
Dave Peterson - National Endowment for Democracy, USA
Nicole Richards - USA
Youba Sokona - Environmental and Development Action in the Third World (ENDA Tiers Monde), Senegal
Nidhi Tandon - Networked Intelligence for Development, Canada
A Babatunde Thomas - United Nations Special Initiative on Africa (UNSIA), New York
L. Muthoni Wanyeki - African Women's Development and Communications Network, Kenya

Kapijimpanga: Frankly, Africa has not been marginalized. We as Africa (governments and institutions) and Africans (as people) have marginalized ourselves. We have adopted or allowed our so-called leaders to agree and to adopt policies that have led to this marginalization. We as Africans at different levels must accept this position. We must not externalize the problems or relegate them to someone else. We should rather see ourselves as having contributed to these problems because it is within this knowing and acknowledgement of our mistakes that we begin to find meaningful solutions.

We must turn our language around so that in every problem that we have faced, we can see for ourselves new opportunities for change. We could say, for example, that Africa accepted prescriptions, and that we have adopted policies that have marginalized us in the global trading system... etc. For within this, we can find alternative policies that will not marginalise us. Externalising problems shuts the door to our self-knowledge and self-determination and ability to define and manifest the reality that we want.

McNeely: Each of the panelists are keen to notice who is left out of programs and policies designed to "help Africa." Abdallah points out, none of the economic programs imposed on Africa from outside took into account the informal sector where women, children and the elderly are a major producers. Adebusoye points out in her paper that these sectors pay a high price, in terms of having no access to wealth generating resources, but they support a great number of people increasingly made unproductive by the spread of AIDS.

As Africa adjusts to each new program promising to reduce poverty and to bring development, people reel from environmental destruction, increased poverty and an increasing sense that they have no control over the "rules of the game." Civil society is left out in formal trade negotiations at the WTO as pointed out by Njinkeu through his discussion of how there is no real sense of "ownership." Civil society is also left out of a parallel economic system existing on the continent. Here, enterprising characters trade arms and diamonds, which, with the investment of foreign capital, have served to keep deadly conflicts going in countries like Angola and the DRC.

Odinkalu: Ben Abdallah's very rich and original contribution unfortunately ends at the point where it was beginning to get really interesting. Among many other useful points made in this contribution, he suggests that Africa "must, therefore, demand from the multilateral trading system as much access as possible for its products to the markets of the wealthy countries. It must seek to attenuate the effects of new rules of commerce on this trade. And finally, it must rethink its comparative geopolitical advantages in order to benefit from complementarity of resources under advantageous conditions that are necessary for its development", a point that is pursued in varying degrees by at least two other panelists.

This is quite interesting but seems to me, on closer examination to be based on a doubtful premise. For what are we going to be demanding access? You only demand access for what you produce. And by "produce", I mean value-added production by domestic enterprise( s). It doesn't help to demand access for the extracts from the earth which, excepting a few exceptions, we don't control anyway.

Kapijimpanga: Why are we stuck in primary commodity production? Answers to this question are very interesting, but it is becoming clear that it is because we have not implemented the Lagos Plan of Action recommendation on putting science and technology in the service of development, and thus reinforcing autonomous capacity of African countries in this field. Instead, we have tended to believe that the transformation from raw material to manufactured products will be undertaken by foreign investors, especially the multinationals.

As is becoming evident in Zimbabwe, these multinationals have no interest in going beyond primary material production because completing the production process outside Africa is more beneficial to them. This seems to be the case of TNCs in the chrome industry, which have no interest in going beyond producing ingots of ferrochrome for which the price difference between the chromite ore and the ingot is something in the region of 1000 times in spite of the intermediary ingot process via furnaces. Zimbabwe could be the largest producer of stainless steel had the multinationals dominating the industry shown any interest at all. Africans tend to assume that TNCs have our interest at heart and this is totally misleading.

Thomas: The poor results from export oriented growth policy despite rapid growth in the volume of world trade is indeed troublesome. The issues of the WTO, the incalculable threat and limited opportunities from globalization, the slow pace of regional integration, low level of intra-African trade, and current poor prospects of having in place a balanced and equitable (and one should add transparent) trading system are all quite valid concerns. However, in reviewing these concerns, the passing reference to the "weak industrial and technological bases" of African economies leaves a major gap in the reflections on the trade issue and the overall theme.

What separates the rich from the poor are science and technology. This was duly recognized in the Lagos Plan of Action. Two decades later, there is still no action! Why? Technological changes in the advanced countries were designed to meet their development challenges and with a few exceptions, applications to the rest of the world have been largely incidental. Opportunities to close the gap between the rich and the poor, through the globalization of knowledge, have been limited, while the rapid technological changes in the advanced countries continue to amplify the gap.

Sokona: Liberalization of trade has not removed some of the barriers and constraints that most African countries face in gaining more access to Northern markets. The world economy is structured in such a way that it keeps African economies in a perennial state of dependency.

Africa's challenge of a multilateral trade system beneficial to the world community may appear a bit of a wishful thinking to cynics who argue that, in spite of the benefits of regional groupings, Africa has nurtured too many false hopes of regionalism and South/ South co-operation. Creating a level playing field as Njinkeu rightly underlines is vital since trade imbalances, coupled with structural difficulties experienced by developing countries, would only serve to create greater poverty and create a even more distorted picture of the world economy.

The other challenge is also for NGOs and civil society to gain more insight into the politics of trade liberalisation and how it favors one group to the detriment of another.

The real winners at the Seattle World Trade Organisation Conference were not the American superpower with its arsenal of multinationals, nor the European Union, or even Southern countries united in their purpose. At Seattle, civil society, backed by NGOs, symbolized the biblical story of David and the Goliath and won the battle.

Odinkalu: This appears to me to return us to the age-old, and increasingly dated dichotomy between "import substitution" and "export promotion" and runs a risk of perpetuating the existing international "division of labour". The Lome Convention, which is cited as a possible panacea, has its history and origins in a desire to perpetuate precisely this division of labor in which Africa originally provided the raw materials for European industry. The tragedy is that Africa is no longer in a position to even provide these raw materials. Our environment has been devastated by it all. So much of what we offer under Lome these days is slave labour for the EU.

Kapijimpanga: People working in the trade area acknowledge that a broad openness has not led to increased access to foreign markets. On the contrary, walls are growing higher in the North. So, should Africa liberalize under the notion that this might result in increased external market access? As recognized by the Cairo Agenda for Relaunching Africa's Economic and Social Development, openness in Africa has been faced with consolidation of economic groupings, e. g. the single European market. So one would have to be careful in making such a link without understanding the possible negative consequences. While this is easy to say on hindsight, would this not be the case on analysis prior to policy adoption?

On the issue of lowered barriers to entry into African markets, again, people here have documented the fact that these have had the effect of de-industrialization in many parts of Africa. This is largely due to the sequencing problem and lack of accompanying measures to consolidate local industrial production.

On import substitution: this policy must not be condemned for the sake of condemnation. The key issue about import substitution was to close the glaring gap or divergence between consumption and production. In Africa, there has always been a gap between what Africa consumes and what it produces. It consumes what it does not produce and produces for trade what it does not consume. So, convergence of resource use and consumption, on the one hand, and convergence between resource base and consumption can be one element to the stability of any economic system. It is on this basis that, as a general rule, external trade must be an extension of domestic trade in order for the economy not to have severe external shocks.

Thomas: The focus of the four contributions on the series of flawed and costly policies and the shortcomings of policy dialogue and structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) are well founded. However, one important development, that needs to be acknowledged and further thought given to fostering it, is the changing nature of this dialogue. An important branch of government i. e. parliament and civil society/ NGOs, are getting actively involved by providing countervailing levers and making it possible to come to terms with African realities. Namely, that "getting the price right", "opening up the economies" or relying on market forces alone is not enough. Further progress would require well-informed and visionary leadership, mass mobilization and communication necessary to sustain and fan the flame of openness and tolerance.

The reference to the catastrophic results of various privatization programs is a valid example of the types of policy failures cited. The policy implication is that there is a need for (i) private/ public sector partnerships, as market forces alone are not the answer, (ii) micro level perspective in macro policies and adjustment programmes, (iii) better understanding of the intrinsic differences between the productivity of African economies and those of the other regions of the World, and most importantly, (iv) the structural transformation of these economies.

Kapijimpanga: In responding to the issues of what strategies can Africa use to win national subregional and international markets in an environment of growing liberalisation, the first point to be made here is that the developed countries have been liberalising slowly and taking into account their national, subregional and international markets. Africa has to do the same and not just jump to the idea that international trade is the answer to development, even if one were to acknowledge the possible positive effects of external trade. The issues around trade have been well articulated in Africa and there have been adequate reasons for starting with internal then proceeding to subregional and then international trade. In other words, external trade is and should be an extension of domestic trade in order to avoid the consequences of external shocks. It is in this context that Africa has challenged South Africa's flirting with the European Community, as there is the potential of compromising regional integration.

Again, this boils down to analysis of a particular policy and its consequences. Africans know this already, but why do we think international trade is the answer to our questions. Why should Africa be carried away by growing liberalisation without having control over this process? We must exert ourselves and not leave ourselves vulnerable. We need to build up a critical mass of agreement that we must have a say in the global trends. "God only helps those that help themselves", as people in Africa tend to say. The Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos of 1980 provide the guidelines. Let us move on these now.

McNeely: Ben Abdallah asks if Africa can unlock the financial surpluses necessary to build the physical, human and institutional foundation it needs to diversify its production and become integrated into the world economy. This will require a large investment in education and in infrastructure. This is a central question that concerns other participants as well, but the prospects look bleak. As long as the global economy seems focused on profit and people as consumers, it seems that there is limited interest in any type of "balanced and equitable multilateral trading system, which benefits the majority of the world population" as mentioned by Dominique Njinkeu.

Thomas: Empirical evidence abounds on how wealth-creating technological innovations have substituted knowledge for materials and other physical resources, and how knowledge tends to accumulate exponentially with one innovation creating opportunities for others. This issue is at the heart of the answer to the common question, namely, how does Africa become master of its considerable natural resources, transform them into wealth for the benefit of its own people, and compete in the global market? Africa needs this knowledge base in order to be able to benefit from the diffusion of innovation, innovate itself for sustainable development and be an active rather than a passive partner in the global economy.

Information technology, believed to offer an opportunity for bridging the gap in technological development, is constrained by ecological factors and the requisite knowledge is still not being globalized. Africa will have to make a conscious effort to nurture the seeds of its endogenous science and technology capacity by ensuring, for example, that the inequality in the educational space is redressed through investment in human capital. Africa must be seen not just as consumers of technology, but also as contributors to its advancement. In general, the top three priorities of Africa should be education, education and education.

Kapijimpanga: Growth must be a result of development, and we need to use those measures that reflect development and not growth. For example, we could begin to use indicators such as how many children are in school as compared to last year, or how many have access to clean water. The need to aggregate economic indicators into concepts like GDP growth tends to mislead people as to what is going on. So, the fundamental point here is that we must also use tools of analysis that reflect what we want to see. That it is fashionable to talk GDP growth rates does not necessary mean that the concept is useful. Over the past ten years, UNDP has been developing other ways of measuring development. We should now ask the ECA to further develop these tools in Africa rather than sticking to the usual concepts that do not reflect the African reality, such as economic growth or per capita growth. These concepts do not say how the ordinary people on the ground are fairing.

In responding to what resources governments can draw upon to meet social demands and social needs, it is important to dispel the notion that resources here refer simply to financial resources. I recall a report by Yoweri Museveni, President of Uganda, when he said that Africa's problem is not money but rather how to manage its human resources that Africa indeed has. I recall that soon after independence, most African governments attempted pooled all available resources together to provide education and health. Because adequate attention was not paid to the productive sector, expenditures on social services were not sustainable. How can we make them sustainable? Let us go back to our own ideas as enshrined in the Lagos Plan of Action. Let us be more decisive in introducing economic policies that positively impact on increasing productive capacity. This is far from reliance on foreign or modern technology. You do not need multinationals to produce cooper in a country like Zambia. Modern technology is not necessarily the answer to Africa's technology problem. Again go back to Lagos and find answers there. They are embedded in the principle of our taking control over our own destiny.

Thomas: Poverty, not so much of means, but more of the mind continues to take a heavy toll on Africa's population. Although more than two decades have elapsed, and Africa is now afflicted by the HIV/ AIDS pandemic more than any other region of the World, there is still some validity in the conviction of Sir Arthur Lewis that, " The LDCs (and in particular African countries collectively) have within themselves all that is required for growth. They have surpluses of fuel and of the principal mineral resources. They have enough land to feed themselves if they cultivate it properly. They are capable of learning the skills of manufacturing and of having the capital required for modernization. Their development does not in the long run depend on the existence of the developed countries, and their potential for growth would be unaffected even if all the developed countries were to sink under the sea".

McNeely: Paulina Adebusoye-Makinwa speaks of the "workforce bulge" that may be the "basis for more investment, greater labor productivity and rapid economic development." I agree that this may be the correct sequence, but I wonder whether poverty reduction naturally follows. With markets being extremely competitive, Africa has an ability, due to the failed programs explained above, to offer the cheapest labor, but will jobs alone alleviate poverty? As developing countries compete to offer the lowest wages, the question of ethics, as raised by Yassine Fall, becomes central.

Sokona: The rationale that a decrease in population will prompt a reduction in poverty needs to be demystified. While there may be a link between the escalating poverty trends and the rise in population, the one scenario only partially resolves the other. The issue of food insecurity is worsened by environmental degradation, fragile ecology, desertification and drought, unfavourable terms of trade and so on.

Sensitization programs on family planning and birth control need to be accompanied with real bottom up incentives and policies. Thus, instead of demonizing population growth, a more positive approach consisting of providing basic sanitation, health and educational facilities for the existing population should be adopted.

Governments need to take a holistic approach regarding population growth and develop population policies that take the constraints and risks that women are exposed to into account, e. g. child mortality. Women would be reticent to adopt birth control measures if government cannot guarantee the survival of their children. Therefore, proper antenatal and postnatal facilities must be put in place to support women and babies.

Religious factors that inhibit birth control must also be taken into Consideration, since for some people, this is a non-negotiable factor. On the other hand, decision makers must guard against the reverse trend of population growth, i. e. population decline. Such demographic shifts would be a new dimension of population growth and the socio-economic implications must be addressed on a longer time horizon. Rapid population decline will be a problem and society would need to change its perception and attitude towards child bearing. The reverse of population explosion will bring about an aging population like the situation in China. In addition, the benefits of population control will be lost if the reverse trend emerges. The work force and production will be seriously affected if a rapid population decline became the dominant trend.

Thomas: There is clearly need for the broadest perspective on population with commensurate attention devoted to critical issues of food and agriculture, famine, gender, youth unemployment in particular, the supply of skilled labor, improvements in knowledge and the translation of these into increased productivity. All of these and their correlates should inevitably lead to a re-examination of the over-population paradigm. Drawing attention to the gravity of the HIV/ AIDS pandemic and the threat to African economies is perhaps the most significant dimension of this first theme. But solutions to this threat to global peace and security were lacking, and so was the sense of urgency it definitely requires. High profile advocacy on preventive measures and access to affordable drugs are some of the issues requiring urgent actions.

Situating Africa's predicament in the global context and posing poignant questions about the role of external forces or exogenous factors are quite valid. But answers on how to transform the negative factors into positive forces for change, in particular, translating human needs into economic opportunities are lacking.

Sokona: Women need to be given greater assistance to enable their effective participation in decision-making structures. It is true that they are increasingly affected by HIV. Women are vulnerable to all sorts of respiratory diseases due to their exposure to traditional fuel and all its inherent problems. Better sustainable development options and clean energy objectives should be taken to reduce the drudgery encountered by marginalized sections of the community, such as women and girls, in their daily household chores and activities. Thus, they could devote their time and resources to income generating activities and gain better access to educational facilities.

Kapijimpanga: Although the issues of human development had been at the forefront of independence struggles and noted in the Lagos Plan of Action and the African Alternative, the ideas of bringing the human being to the center of the development process were consolidated in the Khartoum Declaration adopted in March 1988. The Declaration aimed towards a human-focused approach to socioeconomic recovery and development in Africa. The Declaration also noted that, since human beings are the center of all development, Africa's men and women are the main factors and the ends for whom and by whom any program and implementation of development must be justified. Among other things, the declaration focused on taking human conditions as the only final measure of development in Africa, as well as securing African people in terms of production, personal security, increased incomes, and access to basic needs..

In a further attempt to relaunch Africa's economic and social development, the Cairo Agenda for Action was adopted by the OAU in Addis Ababa in June 1995. Taking note of the experiences of the African people over many years, the Declaration noted that Africa must take new steps to ensure that it became an active partner in world economic system. Africa was to adopt a new vision for its development and translate this vision into appropriate programs. The same document recognized that for many years Africans had adopted many plans, strategies and programs for the development of our countries. It also recognized that these plans and program were not adequately implemented by the majority of our countries. To rectify this situation, African countries were to take effective measures within a specified time frame to ensure for satisfactory implementation and follow-up. The document requested us to adopt the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos.

Thomas: As implied in Fall's contribution, how can Africa regain key elements of its past history, which was replete with remarkable creativity and major contributions to human civilization?

Kapijimpanga: Other questions that arise in relation to development policies are (just to mention a few): What are our principles of development? How can we have full control over our policies and not have outsiders dictate to us what we must do? Why are we allowing ourselves to be dictated at? Why are we allowing ourselves to have political leadership that does not represent our interests? How can we regain our development agenda? How far can we move on this? What have been the major constraints in securing popular participation, and how can we remove these constraints? How can we, as civil society movements, bring about this change? How can we put pressure on African governments and African intergovernmental organizations to accept agreements that benefit the people of Africa? Our main point of call is not the outside but our institutions and ourselves. These are the real challenges that we face, and this is the level at which the debate must engage; not just analysis and hoping that someone else will change things for us.

Thomas: Finally, I would like to flag just one more serious gap in the contributions. Leaving out the subject of military expenditure in our reflections on African realities constitutes the use of a marginal lens. Its role in perpetuating poverty and ignorance is quite considerable. If military expenditure is substantially reduced in favor of social sectors, winning the war on poverty stands a better chance.

According to the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report "the arms business is one of the most reprehensible sectors of international trade... with sales... to countries where millions of people lack the most basic means of survival." The eleven top arms exporters alone accounted for total sales of US$ 151 billion from 1988-92. Of these, the top five arms exporting countries which account for 86 % of the conventional weapons exported to developing countries from 1988-92, (including to trouble spots in Africa) are in descending order, the former Soviet Union, the United States, France, China, and the United Kingdom, all permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. According to the UN's arms register, some of the choices by LDCs in 1992 cited was Nigeria's purchase of 80 battle tanks from the United Kingdom at a cost that could have immunized all of the two million unimmunized children and provided family planning services to nearly 17 million of the more than 20 million couples who lack such services. There is clearly need for innovative ideas on appropriate institutional frameworks to help address this serious impediment to poverty reduction and sustainable development of African countries.

Odinkalu: All this leads up to regional integration as an option that deserves much closer examination. In a world of multi-mega combines, trade areas and territories, most of our states in Africa, even where they pretend to exist as political or quasi-political entities, are simply unviable economic propositions. To what extent are the problems Taoufik rightly alludes to the result of national elites who are afraid of being dwarfed or rendered politically irrelevant by integration? To what extent are those problems the result of the old spheres of colonial iInfluence and the mutual suspicions and recriminations between the different "phones"- Anglophone, Francophone, Arabophone, Lusophone etc.? How many of our governments are prepared to make the adjustments in educational policy or investment in skill levels, for instance, implied in making a right to establishment meaningful?

Okigbo: Julius Ihonvbere of the Ford Foundation has admonished us to "break the wall of intellectual and political silence, build viable networks ... and make our discussions meaningful to policy." Silence is one of the greatest diseases afflicting us. We know what is wrong with our societies (including the ENDEMIC corruption that has stymied positive change). But most people are silent about these. We need to discuss how to break the thick walls of silence in Africa. Our silence provides the manure for nurturing inconsiderate leaders at all levels. We can't help but ask: So what, after all these beautiful presentations of the panel?

Hartuv: From what I` ve read it seems that many of us see similarities in the economic fates of African countries and do not comment about the differences between individual states. Four African countries have per capita GNP near or over U. S. $4000. Let us disregard the Seychelles, a country with less than 100,000 population and dependant on tourism. Let us disregard Gabon, a country that has immense natural resources, but has regressed somewhat since 1982. However, we have Botswana and Mauritius that have progressed steadily each year since independence. Their social indicators, such as high school education, health, and longevity are similar to developed countries .Would anyone care to elaborate about the discrepancies between those two "lucky" states and most of the continent?

Up to the oil crises in 1973-4 and 1979-80, other African countries such as the Ivory Coast and Kenya (and Uganda up to the Idi Amin coup) developed steadily. Any comments? All countries that adopted state socialist economic regimes faired badly and declined rapidly. In 1970, Madagascar was more prosperous than Mauritius. In 1956 ,Ghana was more prosperous than South Korea. Any comments?

Hashi: I think that the Botswanan economy is based mostly on the resource wealth under her territory. Secondly, Botswana's political system was generally dominated by a particular elite that revolved around a particular social group. Its closeness to South Africa and its "realistic" foreign policy during the Cold War are some points to consider as far as political stability is concerned. I know a little about Mauritius so I will hold my comments about that issue.

On the whole, I think that it is important to assert that African countries do have differences. However, their commonality outweighs their differences. The countries that have exhibited political instability belong to the general pattern of international Keynesianism predominant from 1945-1973. The end of the post-war settlement and the rise of neo-liberalism have affected quite radically terms of trade for what remain single cash crop countries or mineral and oil countries. Internally, the lack of a truly capitalist African middle class has produced a predatory anti-nationalist group that is responsible for the current mess.

Njinkeu: Why is it so difficult for African countries to sustain positive growth rates over several years? About four years ago I visited Accra for the first time and was surprised that the city was not better than Douala or Yaounde in my home country, Cameroon. After discussing with friends I was told that in 1983 even if you had the money you could not buy salt or beer in Accra. A similar story could be said for Uganda around 1986. In 1983, Douala and Yaounde and the rest of Cameroon were prospering. If you step back in 2000 and look at the economic history of several African countries, you will see that periods of strong economic performances coincide with those when the leadership of the country was committed and supported by a public sector capable of designing and implementing sound policies. Weak performance also coincide with periods when these two attributes were not simultaneously present. I will then suggest that ensuring sustainable development should give some priority to these two dimensions. Let me say that leadership does not only mean the character of the president alone. We have several cases where a well-intended heads of state have changed because of other forces trying to weaken their authority.

I would also want to say that the issue is not necessarily socialism versus capitalism, even if on average those countries that went the capitalist way performed better than those that opted for socialism. If the attributes above are met, we shall acknowledge that a strong private sector, where local entrepreneurs work in harmony with foreign partners, should come as a third important component.

Important constraints to African sustainable growth/ development are the high transactions cost of doing business in Africa. In each of the success cases indicated, a consistent effort toward private sector development was made.

Alpman: I had the good fortune of living in Uganda until 1986/ 7, and must respectfully disagree with you, albeit from a perspective that does not diminish nor obviate your observation. If `you had the money', you could get beer and salt in Uganda. It just had to be a lot of money, paying your own way or sponsoring someone to drive to Kenya, where almost anything could be bought.. With the right amount of money, you could even get a Rolls Royce and one or two were indeed making their way around the innumerable potholes of Uganda. The debate about the waste of foreign currency on luxury goods, be it Heineken, Loewenbraeu or Carlsberg beer, some Single Malt whisky or a Mercedes Benz, seems to have dissipated in the past few years, possibly so as not to upset our "friends" in Lome or at the WTO. But perhaps new leadership has had to accommodate post-colonial cultural standards regarding the contemporary symbols that are associated with leadership.

Nonetheless, I think such consumption patterns deserves some attention, if only because it is just one example of how African national and regional economies still do, and possibly must, offer some restrictions to trade in and with foreign currency. It would certainly be interesting to hear from other participants on how these restrictions have affected and should affect international trade agreements, and whether there may be undue pressure on African economies from more industrialized countries.

Benamrane: It is true that Africa is plural, with different countries with different human and material resource sizes. But Africa is one as a poor, dependant, sacked and plundered continent. Saying that, all African countries in the North, the South, the East and the West share the same injustice. If the oil crisis of 1973/ 74 and 19979/ 80 stopped the development dynamic of many African countries, one must add that these crises have been, thanks to the recycling of oil revenue/ rent, the cause of the debt problem in the poorest countries. If countries that adopted so called socialist systems in the 1960s and 1970s failed, one needs to explain why those which did not follow this underdeveloped socialism also failed and did not become like the "Tigers" in Asia.

Do we really think that after 20 years of structural adjustment, Africa is in better situation than that attempted by 20 years of state planning? And if we need to go further, why is Africa today in worse situation than 40 years before, under the colonialism rule. Yesterday's populations were under state colonialism; today they are under Bretton Woods institutions and multinational firms- a new colonialism more dangerous than the former one.

Njinkeu: To Atilla Alpman, the most important consideration is not whether you could find a good on a market or not. Your information on Uganda exactly proves that the situation was quite comparable to Ghana. I was saying that prior to the period associated with some economic growth in Uganda or Ghana, the economic conditions had substantially deteriorated. In relation to Hartuv's query, I say during that period both countries did not have a development promoting strategy. If we consider the period when these economies have been growing, several people will accept that a somewhat development oriented leadership prevailed. I then insist that leadership needs to go beyond the individual.

For those countries that have been lucky to have a development oriented leader, they need that leadership to be broad-based. This is not related to whether the leader is socialist or capitalist. Interestingly enough, the two leaders during periods of positive growth rates in Ghana and Uganda used to be socialist! This seems to apply at the individual levels. I know several cases where prominent businessmen die with their activities partly because the leadership of the portfolio remained concentrated on the individual.

Moemeka: Without a conducive local environment, no amount of internal or external investment will succeed. We need to understand the relationship between investment and the socio-cultural realities of local conditions. This is what Taoufik Ben Abdallah has in mind when he asked: "Can foreign direct investment have any kind of strengthening effect of the economy if there does not exist at the local level a sufficiently dense network of enterprises with which this investment can connect? Can foreign direct investment establish itself firmly in a situation where purchasing power is weak and the market is small?"

Development is a multi-faceted endeavor; so are solutions to its problem. No one is suggesting that trade agreements, global commerce, regionalization and foreign investment are not important. They are, but their utility lies in being able to view them in relation to what local capacities can put to effective use; in the light of the presence or absence of selfless leadership and a committed citizenry. I stand to be corrected when I say that it is hard, as of now, to find more than a few countries in Africa where the good of the majority overrides the interest of leaders, their select few, and the local elite. Only education, especially adult and non-formal or positive development oriented public enlightenment, can produce the necessary conducive attitude and behavior change that makes for effective utilization of investments and development efforts. Once again, Ben Adballah shows his understanding of the multifaceted nature of the problems of African development and how to effectively begin to solve them. He says, "The foundation must be a massive investment in education and training and in economic and social infrastructure, together with the construction of stable and democratic institutions. Without these, no vision of sustainable development stands a chance."

Leege: Yes, per capita income and economic growth say little about income distribution. True, Botswana has been richly endowed with mineral wealth. But other nations have also been richly endowed with relatively small populations for their landmass. Angola, for one, comes to mind. Nevertheless, I would imagine that most Angolans would still be quite pleased to escape their misery and live like those who are below the poverty line in Botswana. At least the resources in Botswana have been invested in a useful manner, whereas in Angola, billions of dollars of oil and diamond revenue have been frittered away in a senseless war or looted by corrupt politicians in the ruling elite.

Good governance and peace have a lot to do with progress. How to get from point A (Angola) to point B (Botswana) is the real question (no pun intended). Alas the answer to that question remains elusive.

I am fortunate to have had the opportunity to work in both Africa and Asia. While comparisons are difficult to make due to differences of history and culture, I cannot help but contrast the trajectory followed by Angola and Cambodia in the 1990s. Both countries entered the decade in shambles on all fronts. UN peacekeepers were sent into both of them (albeit in much larger number to Cambodia) to bring peace, help organize elections and usher in a prosperous, new democratic era.

While Angola has failed miserably on all counts in two separate processes (Bicesse and Lusaka), Cambodia has managed through fits and starts to become almost a normal country again. People are still poor, and the country does not have the benefit of a large amount of natural resources, but there is peace now, and life has improved measurably for most people (more for some than others, of course). Foreign investment has occurred, especially in the garment industry, and exports from those factories have taken off thanks to preferential trading agreements with the U. S. (though they were recently capped because volume became too high), generating a fair amount of jobs. Tourists have now returned in droves to the famed Angkor Wat temples in spite of bad roads and poor facilities, bringing significant revenue into the country with them, and also creating jobs.

Cambodia is no star when it comes to good governance. There is still a great deal of corruption, the prime minister brooks little opposition, and the judiciary is still in an embryonic state. But there have been elections; there has been a will to work toward reconciliation and political coalition through innovative "win-win" solutions, and the private sector is given the space it needs to grow and create employment opportunities. Are there some lessons here that could be applicable in the African context?

Benamrame: I would like to contribute to the debate concerning the capacity and willingness of African governments to design and implement perspective, plan, strategy and economic policy. For those who work in the field, in countries yesterday and today under adjustment programmes and tomorrow under Programme/ Facility for Growth and Poverty Reduction, it is a fact that the leadership of this exercise is taken by the Bretton Woods Institutions in accordance with their major contributors, i. e., the G7 country members. Concerning the ability (sovereignty) of those dependant countries, the best way forward is concerted African expression. But here, we start another debate- debate on regional integration and its status in the ongoing process of "globalbalkanization". One part of the solution will depend on the structure of the future United Nations System. I do think that we are now embarking upon a new colonialism driven by transnational firms, which configure the real global power in the global village.

Richards: I totally agree that privatization has failed to deliver expected results. But what is the answer to an ailing, highly centralized state machinery, unaccountable and incapable of satisfying the basic needs of the general populace.

In Zimbabwe, for example, where the mass of the "wealth" is in the hands of white people, and most, if not all, of the significant black Zimbabwean owned wealth is that which is held by the state, privatization seems to lead on a path of further transferring that wealth into the hands of whites, both inside and outside the country.

Is the call for privatization running along a track to benefit the people in African countries, or is it a call running along a track to benefit non-Africans? Is it a subtle (and not so subtle) move at recolonization through control of wealth? Certainly an answer can be found which doesn't support such recolonization?

Alpman: Firstly, we should not afford other nations, particularly those whom continue to benefit from the legacy of colonialism and from the economic dependency on loans and other such dubious charity, the luxury of absolution. It is also the responsibility of the "West" (or "north", or whatever you may want to call "it") to achieve a modicum of justice in redressing historical wrongs, however difficult it may seem to articulate these past injustices. It doesn't take much to concede that Africa is still being exploited, though it may be awkward to tell moderately well-intentioned "Westerners" that they are "imperialists-by-default".

Secondly, we should not be so naive as to expect that anyone would help us if such help is not in "their" best interest. We certainly need to make the case that peace and prosperity on the continent are a better long-term investment than fostering or feeding off war, poverty and illiteracy- and I don't believe we are doing very well in that regard.

I don't believe that helpful to propose, explicitly or not, that Africans have the political or economic autonomy to assume all responsibility for developing an "adequate macroeconomic framework".

Njinkeu: What I am saying is the following: The ideal situation is that each country design and implement its policies and in this framework ask for possible help. Remember, I was responding to somebody who claimed I should not have said that Africa is marginalized or that African countries have received and implemented policies prescribed by third parties.

This is why I stressed that one key element of sustainable development in Africa is capacity building in the design and implementation of policies. If this is done we will more forcefully articulate the responsibilities of third parties. See how difficult it is in this forum to ask the correct policy question and discuss it! Yes, for some issues (e. g. debt) solutions should be put in an historical perspectives after situating responsibilities.

To your second reason, I will just respond that if we have the capacity to formulate and implement policies the issue of somebody taking care of our interests will not arise. One point I alluded to in my previous interventions is in fact that our international policies account for the need of Africans to (as you conclude) " have the political or economic autonomy to assume all responsibility for developing an "adequate macroeconomic framework".

With this can I then suggest the need for our governments to give priority to capacity building in their negotiations of international agreements. In which case I would like to listen to proposals on what exactly should be included in such agreements.

Alpman: Certainly, I would agree that capacity-building is perhaps the best terminology to date for improving administrative, managerial and enterpreneurial skills. This is possibly what development theorists and practitioners have tried to do for the past few decades more or less successfully.

What I was trying to stress was simply that we cannot avoid "articulating the responsibilities of third parties", and may feel hamstrung by the courtesies of international relations or, worse still, are blinded by our own rage. Of course, I may have stated my case a little too strongly and agree in principle that "if we have the capacity to formulate and implement policies, the issue of somebody taking care of our interests will not arise". Autonomy, political or economic, may in principle be a worthwhile goal, but it should not distract us from articulating, particularly in international agreements, an embrace of interdependence and mutual benefit as the primary alternative to dependency. I guess my point could best be summarized by stating that there is too much emphasis on autonomy. Focusing only on peculiarly African solutions may deny us the opportunities to seek collaborative solutions beyond the continent and place us in a position of perpetual antagonism to and competition with others. Again, I should add that I believe we have to present more coherent strategies to convince most non-African governments, policy-makers, business, media and civil society that peace and prosperity in Africa are in the best long-term interest of all. Silly, or sad, as it may seem, we've presented little for "Westerners" to get excited about since "Free Mandela" and we need to be conscious of having to also appeal to a constituency that demands- at best- sound bites.

Bobbie: I have been listening to the discussion with great interest but totally amazed that perhaps the predicament of Africa is caused by her own citizens- all of us.

Please let us talk about to WHAT AREA( S) Africans must immediately direct our human resources (capacity to use our human brain power) to advance ourselves for our own good- the destiny one said we should take into our own hands. Remember, "no one is an island ...", so we must advance and merge with the global advancement.

I believe that unless we as African shift from our usual desire to show-off by talking big, criticizing the past to the extent that we forget that we need to move on, referring to God/ Allah-knows-which-documents-or-Plans and this conference and that conference; unless we forget for a moment that we are big-shots and work at the high-powered office or group, and get down to some real solutions, this millennium will pass us by and we Africans will be blamed for our inaction.

Gomera: Your contention that we need to go beyond words is certainly on target. Yes, we can talk all we like about the inadequacies of our history, and the potentials of this and that technology, but unless we get to do something about it- another millennium will pass us by! Doing something about it requires a complete change of the African mind-set. That requires taking responsibility for our own actions and the consequences thereof, rather than finding comfort in expedient slogans. (Ever noticed how many times political leaders mention the words "democracy and governance", yet do little about them?)

One writer rightfully pointed out the impediments to entering markets that Africa faces and the low levels of investments in product research and development in Africa. These, plus the shortage of an appropriately trained African labor force and the many "idle" workers in Africa's rural areas, leave us in an uncompetitive position (compared to other "emerging" markets). Getting out of this requires large financial investments (in product research and development, market development and human resource capacity building) and sacrifices (sometimes big political sacrifices).

Mebratu: On Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), yes, the self-reliant and selfsustainment philosophy enshrined in it can provide a strong basis for development in Africa. The problem with LPA is that it is not designed and promoted as a `bottom-up' process with the active participation of all development stakeholders and with adequate responsiveness to diverse local conditions and realities in the region. It is more of a transplanting process having governments as the key player rather than being a transformational process involving all sectors of the society, including government. The lack of the necessary conditions at the national level is the major hindrance for the success of the effort made to promote and implement LPA at the regional level. In this context, LPA requires a fundamental reorientation if it is to be more than a political document and have an impact on the development process in Africa.

Brooks: There are four principles that are universal and must be recognized: 1. There is no such thing as "African" economics. There is economics, period. Ninety percent of Africa's problems stem from poverty created by unbelievably unrealistic economic policies (often foisted on African countries by well-meaning but clueless Western development "experts".) 2. When it comes to democracy and human rights there is no such thing as an "African Way". African states MUST enshrine basic human rights and regular, free and fair plebiscites to establish the legitimacy of government. 3. Trade is always good for BOTH partners. There are NO losers in the long run to increased trade. Trade is ESSENTIAL for Africa's prosperity. 4. Economic and political change in Africa must come from the bottom up. Even subsistence farmers ain't stupid (many African presidents and pundits will be surprised to hear this!). People KNOW what is best for THEM. Forcing inane economic policies on "ignorant masses" just don't work anymore (if it ever did!). Giving citizens opportunities to improve their lot themselves (though opening world markets, ending urban food subsidies, or freeing internal markets from commodity boards) WILL let them make their own economic choices that are ultimately correct. Allowing free elections will let them decide when it is time to throw useless bums out of political office. Stop trying to impose change. Set the right conditions and allow change to happen.

Ignoring any of these principles means continued disaster for this continent. Yes, this means that many social safety nets will have to be suspended, but in too many cases these nets are financially unrealistic anyway and are paid for through foreign loans that enslave the country in long term debt. The safety nets can be rebuilt once the state can afford them in the future. Yes, this means that many entrenched workers will either be made redundant or will see their salaries fall drastically, but it also means the next generation of Africans can expect a much more prosperous future. Yes, it means an end to dreams of self-sufficiency, but no country in modern history has ever achieved that anyway. Yes, this means an end to one-party states, to governments founded on a single "big man", to the blurring of party, government and treasury, but only the political elite are going to whine about those changes and we should have little pity for them since they got Africa where it is today . . .

Mebratu: Prescriptions for Africa are abundant. But providing the right prescriptions would require making the proper diagnosis which in turn requires the right mix of diagnostic tools and knowledge systems. That is why the methodological focus becomes very important. There are two methodologies that have been competing for dominance in Africa's policy domain. The first one is the reductionist simplification that tends to see issues in terms of either black or white. This provides the basis for broad generalizations and prescriptions within the framework of a "one-fits-all' model. Such an approach usually generates solutions with limited scope of application and collides with the continuously evolving multiple realities on the ground.

The second approach is one that attempts to overcome the limitations of the reductionist simplification by taking a more `holistic view' of the development process. Such an approach, even is it sounds better than the reductionist simplification, has led to a situation of "detailed complexities", where the root causes (fundamentals) were either misrepresented or were overshadowed by long list of symptomatic solutions.

We have seen the global economic system becoming much more complex within the last few decades. Neither the "reductionist simplification" nor the "holistic summation" would enable us to understand the dynamic complexity of the global socio-economic transformation. In this context, I believe that the evolving "systems-evolutionary" approach as a systems science may provide a sound basis for understanding the dynamic complexity of global and African realities and the overall development challenges.

Ekundayo: In Africa, policies for the generation, distribution and marketing of electrical energy have historically put all those functions in the hands of governments. As a result, the government serves as one single source without competition. The effect has been an effective failure of development, improvement, growth or even service to the populace. As a result, there is an artificial depression in the demands of the populace for services, products and processes which will utilize electric power. Thus, there is depressed production overall. And we wonder about why there is poverty (as defined by us). The underlying reason for this state is that there is no motivation. There is no motivation because the government has no competition in a area of national life, where it has business only as a watchdog, not as a producer/ supplier. The people are not motivated to perform or support performance because they have no reason to do so. They do not prosper from government patronizing them. This can be turned around by governments realizing that people must produce by themselves for themselves what they find appropriate for their needs.

Let us take Nigeria as an example. Nigeria (about 1of 6 Africans on the planet) has more than 100 million people in Nigeria and over 3 million nationals outside the country. For the supply of electric power, Nigeria has only one entity, NEPA. In the post colonial history of the country, 99% of the citizens have never had adequate or constant power supply. Yet, governments have refused to consider creating competition for NEPA in any way, shape or form; citing "security." They considered "privatization" a euphemism for changing the producer and leaving production with only one entity.

Various efforts have been made to make this system work, with complete failure. This situation can be addressed, however, by allowing states and local government to issue licenses to small scale producers. The power needs of Nigeria were last estimated at about 12.5 gigawatts based on current demand, which itself is artificially depressed. This means that at about 2 to 20 megawatts production, the country would require, for about 70% of its current needs, at least about 500 producers. If one adds five hundred, up line and down line services and producers next to this number, we have about 1,500. To create competition and therefore enhance development, multiply this by five and we have about 7,500 Nigerian owned, Nigerian run power and power related enterprises engaged in the business of power alone.

Let us for once assess the probable effects of this situation on the economy. Employment (which will, combined with other auxilliary enterprises, take up to 1 million citizens), research and development, bankruptcies, streamlining, diversification, mergers, expansions, acquisitions and other real economic activities will increase exponentially for at least ten years. Of course, government revenues will expand exponentially. After this, we will begin to see economies of scale. Other demands will be generated for products and services, which will create more enterprises, jobs, and prosperity for more people.

Okigbo: First, on "what it is about the way in which ordinary African citizens take care of survival and livelihood ... and questions about the applicability of normative prescriptions for economic development and growth"- it is important to note the very wide variation among African peoples. So, be cautious in interpreting "ordinary African citizens" as if there are certain standards for judging ordinariness. It is hard to picture "an ordinary South African or Kenyan"- let alone "an ordinary African." If we have to generalize, we can say that for many Africans, there are two forces that impinge on their survival and livelihood. The first force is the state, which is supposed to improve the conditions for survival and livelihood (but in fact often creates more obstacles than solutions). The second force is comprised of primary groups and community associations (the primordial public of kinship relations, according to Paul Ekeh)- which is generally accepted as supportive of the individual's survival and livelihood.

As long as normative prescriptions for economic development come from the state and its associated agents (e. g. The World Bank and public institutions) the socalled "ordinary Africans" will not completely accept the precepts. The notion is pervasive in Africa that the state is to be "cheated' whenever the opportunity presents itself. This colors the perception of the civil service, public utilities, and similar services in the eyes of ordinary Africans. It is artful to avoid public obligations, such as taxation and official levies. Contrast this with the situation in other parts of the world- where state directives are adhered to, as routine behavior.

Kinuthia-Njenga: As individual Africans, do we have a set of values we strongly believe in? Do we have a value system on which we can base our vision for the development and growth of our continent? What are our basic principles? Do we have any standards by which we expect every human being to live? What are the minimum needs that an African human being requires in terms of food, clothing, shelter, health security, knowledge, association and movement? Mahatma Gandhi once said, "God has provided human beings with all that they require for their needs but not necessarily their wants". It pains me when I see so many homeless African people, starved children and adults, ethnic cleansing/ conflicts. It pains me even more when we have to stretch out our hands to the rest of the globe (the Bank, Fund, bilaterals, etc) begging/ borrowing to provide for our basics needs. What has gone wrong?

MacDevette: While there are many things that we cannot control, let's focus on the areas where we can make a positive contribution. We can use the Internet to mobilize African expertise to work on African development projects and to contribute to policy development. This allows us to draw on the rich experience of Africans all over the world in a practical manner. I believe that this is an area that we need to continually build on.

There is a huge pool of creative talent in Africa based on our very varied and unique histories. We need to use this valuable resource to come up with innovative solutions in development planning and product development. The whole world is struggling with the challenges of globalizsation and developing sustainable livelihoods. We can compete globally if we get our act together. Building on the past as a resource is more valuable than being trapped by it.

Put your energy into a few worthwhile initiatives where we can make an impact and beware of wasting time on conferences, meetings, strategies, and deliberations. Let's share learning and experience, but also spend time trying out new ways of doing things. Let us build on small successful initiatives rather than grand plans to save Africa. So my primary contribution will be to my home and province (Cape Town and the Western Cape) and then to the rest of Africa. If we can make small contributions here we will be making Africa a better place.

Kapijimpanga: Survival strategies are generally very creative. One sees this all over Africa in terms of the variety of things (products) that people create during the process of making their livelihood.

I would suggest that one of the key constraints to Africa's economic development is our inability to remove constraints that people in the productive sector are faced with. And yes, Mwalimu Nyerere was right by saying that people develop themselves. But, people are faced with various constraints that institutions like the state are expected to remove. The notion of constraints is a pragmatic one, which would enable us to put into place policies that would remove such constraints and enable these activities to upstream themselves, even in the market place. How do we identify them? They will identify themselves to be of value beyond pure survival. In any case they are already there. We are blinded by our own notions of modernity largely. But they are there! You see them everywhere!

Greenstein: How do people really gain access to land, labor, credit, skills and Jobs? This is the real starting point for analysis. How can one build on the features of African economies, in which for the most part, the informal sector is strong, the formal sector is weak, and the state apparatus is bloated, inefficient and concerned more with extracting resources from society than facilitating the society's development?

Ranting and raving against globalization is not going to help. What is needed is a concrete attempt to examine how these features can be used to bolster the positions of individual countries within the world system. It is doubtful that there can be one African solution, because different countries possess different assets and stand in different relations to global forces. However, discussion of common problems and possible ways forward- encouraging the growth of the SMME sector, providing support to the informal economy, exploring small scale cooperative arrangements, establishing regional links, etc.- is essential.

Kwiatkowski: I have not seen in the discussion thus far proposals for less confiscatory state tax policies in African countries. The informal sector, mentioned as a major and necessary offset to abject poverty for many in Africa, remains informal often because of anti-business tax codes, unreliable legal codes for property and marketing rights, and an in some cases, a contempt held by the state for small business. The fact that women, in many cases, lead and contribute their energies to the small business sector may have something to do with the sense of state contempt for these efforts. When governments decide to "build wealth," they can only do so by unleashing the wealth producing capacity of their citizens.

Kinuthia-Njenga: On a different point- my good old friend, Taoufik Ben Abdallah in his paper raises the issue of the informal sector. We do need to learn some lessons on the evolution of this sector, particularly from the Asian economies. OSCAL in collaboration with UNCHS( Habitat) recently held an expert group meeting on the subject of "promoting value-added activities in the informal sector in Africa", and I do wish to share some of the sentiments of the participants (drawn from Africa and Asia) and some lessons learned in Asia.

Some of the critical ingredients to the success of Asian economies were rural development and distribution of land ownership. Such is the case with Japan, Taiwan and South Korea as well as China and Vietnam. Rural development was placed high on the agenda of these countries, as no amount of industrialization was expected to absorb the population in the non-agricultural industries. Still the most successful efforts in Asia focused on the overall efficiency of the economy.

Thus, while strong policies in favor of the informal sector have been implemented for decades in Asia, many of these have seen to it that efficiency in the market is nurtured and maintained at the same time. Asian experiences point most fundamentally to the importance of a culture and environment that nurture local entrepreneurial activity for which policies play more of a supportive role. Since most successful experiences of Asia involved the exercise of good governance, strong state and interventionist industrial policy, it remains a question whether the weaker governments in Africa, and indeed other Asian countries can follow the example of the former. However, it is also important to note that an important lesson that can be derived from Asia and indeed most developed economies is the strong priority given to the creation of human capital, in terms of education and training (A point that Dominque Njinkeu has emphasized- capacity-building). The strong performance of the private and public sectors in East Asia belies a capability that is honed through universal and high quality education, which has led to high levels of cognitive skills among secondary school graduates.

Okigbo: The same forms of economic activity that address survival strategies are needed for situations at higher levels of livelihood. Our target should not be to discover high order economic activities that show we are now "developed." Rather, we should incrementally build on our present achievements by seeking ways to sustain today's economic growth. The survival targets are, among others, to feed ourselves and provide shelter and gainful employment in areas deemed important by our societies. These are also necessary beyond the level of mere survival. The strategies that can move us away from want and poverty can also take us to higher levels of sustainable development. All our public policies are eloquent about such strategies, but most of them fall short in the delivery.

There is no doubt that (generally speaking) a market of 700 million people is more attractive than one of 70,000 people, if these people constitute a viable economic market. We should develop the constituent internal (national) markets, without which neither conventional nor unconventional activities can promote integration. When the individual economies develop, official policies (no matter how detrimental they might appear) will not stop commercial intercourse between suppliers and consumers. The failure of integration in Africa is PARTLY because we lack the `legislative, implementing, and enforcing" institutions that characterize the EU. For now at least, we have only poor and competing countries. When these countries develop complementary national economic competencies, even in the absence of official integrating policies, private business people and associations will champion inter-country business operations and activities.

Peterson: Last month I visited Somaliland, where I was struck by the apparent prosperity of the economy despite the region's relative isolation from the international community and development aid. I was told that 90 percent of the economy is based on the export of lamb and goat meat to the Arabian Peninsula, and indeed I saw thousands of livestock being shipped from the port of Berbera, and the wealth created for the pastoralists who dominate the society. Taxes and customs duties are minimal or non-existent, and corrupt rent-seeking officials are resisted by businessmen and community leaders. The main lesson of Somaliland seems to be that a relatively weak and non-interventionist government as opposed to the statist and bloated civil servant models that still predominate in Africa is a potential alternative to unleash the enormous enterprise of the average citizen.

I contrast this to a trip I took last year by road from Abidjan to Lagos, most of the way on buses or shared taxis with petty marketers. At every border they were hit up for bribes by customs officials which drastically increased their cost of doing business. We counted ten checkpoints between Cotonou and Lagos alone, almost every official demanded some payment. It was obvious that the border controls served no other purpose than extorting income from mostly honest traders. If these border obstacles within ECOWAS were curtailed as they should be in a free trade area, the economic benefit would undoubtedly be major. I've heard similar accounts throughout Africa. It seems to be easier to export to Europe than across the border within Africa. This is purely a matter of vision and leadership. Dismantle the controls and the useless bureaucracies, unburden the small entrepreneur, stop the wars, and Africa is perfectly capable of feeding and enriching itself. No more need to beg for crumbs from the West.

Tandon: Dave Peterson's snapshot of Somaliland exports points to the fact that African small-scale exporters are often crippled not just by taxes and customs, but also by high standards requirements, particularly by markets in EU and North America. This is especially the case when it comes to food products, whether processed or "live". Trading between African countries means that product standards can be regulated to fit in with expectations of both supply and demand, and it is something that can be regulated between business partners. Take the example of women in Cameroun, who are able to trade in textile products, dried fruits, dessicated coconut, concentrated fruit juices, dried meats and fish with their neighbours in Guinea, Mali, Tchad, Benin. This is a lot easier than exporting these same "organic" products into Europe. If and when they do break into, say, the Swiss market, the tariffs and standardization procedures are the biggest hurdles to jump.

Wanyeki: An end and indicator of gains in the struggle against poverty is the ability to choose between livelihoods, between modes of production that we ourselves own and control. Therefore, it is appropriate to focus on sustainable livelihoods and how our choices of livelihoods are being decreased by the national and international policy choices we are making with regards to finance, trade and investment.

What do we mean by sustainable livelihoods? In the south of Tanzania, in Lindi, there is a center called the Mtwara Media Center. This center has been using participatory video with traditional fishing communities. A ban on traditional fishing practices was imposed by the Ministry responsible. There was a decrease of fish available to traditional fishers due to large scale dynamite fishing for commercial sale to urban markets and for export. Through participatory video, villagers documented their experiences, the decrease in real incomes and their inability to continue to survive on fishing, for both men and women, even though the kinds of fish traditionally caught by men and women, the fishing areas, and the methods were different.

Participatory video enabled the local communities to share their experiences from one village to another. It was an eye opener and enabled them to decide to challenge the ban collectively. They decided to used participatory video to show how traditional fishing methods protect coral, fish eggs and young fish in their reef environment and compared this protection with the devastation of dynamite fishing. With the help of the center, they shot and edited the video and sent representatives from different villages all the way to Dar es Salaam. They managed to get an audience with the Minister. The Minister was impressed by what he saw and lifted the ban on traditional fishing practices.

The result, although positive, created conflict between those who wished to continue with traditional fishing practices and those who wanted to continue with dynamite fishing. What the story does not address is why people within the communities involved were forced to go into dynamite fishing, which is detrimental in the long term, to get money from commercial sales and sport. But the story is an example of how a ministry initially made a policy choice based on the lack of information. It is also an example of how that policy choice was corrected with information.

Another story, also from Tanzania, concerns the Orkonerai Integrated Pastoralists' Survival Program. This program was initiated by Maasai people in Terrat who were facing severe land alienation from wildlife conservation projects, large scale commercial horticultural farmers, and mining. They established a community resource center and entered into contact and information exchange with indigenous people across the world. Based on experiences shared, they engaged with human rights organizations and put forward a case for challenging the forced removal of their community from the Mkomozi game reserve. Last year, they won their case- a historical and precendent-setting case which has recognized that their removal was wrong and is granting restitution. They are going back to court to seek restitution in the form of their original communal grazing lands. They have thus played a part in getting the right to have communal land recognized and protected more explicitly in Tanzania's recent land law review.

The first lesson for us, from these two stories, is that the concept of sustainable livelihoods has not featured in economic planning in Africa. Our economic planning tends to address the commercialization of agriculture for export, which does not address everyone's needs. The second lesson is that national economic policy choices are actually often at odds with the concept of sustainable livelihoods. National economic policy choices are increasingly limited by international commitments and obligations. Why else the investment in fishing for export, in wildlife preservation over people's preservation and large scale horticultural farming over food production?

Yet, these two examples also show that communicating experiences can validate experience and build solidarity. Despite national level constraints, experiences of threats or wrongs and the solidarity so created can find expression in organizing at the local level in a manner that impacts the national level. Organizing at the local level can be successful if it is done with an awareness of national policy objectives and of the context in which national policy is made. For there are other international commitments and obligations which can be utilized. In the case of Terrat, the people drew from international human rights standards and law. These standards were the basis on which they won their case. Other international commitments that can be drawn upon are international labor standards and law and, of course, international standards and law relating to women's rights. From the examples cited, it is also evident that even though the process of negotiating interests, both at the local and national levels, is complex, it can be done.